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CONSISTENT TESTING FOR AN IMPLICATION OF SUPERMODULAR
DOMINANCE
DANBI CHUNG, OLIVER LINTON, AND YOON-JAE WHANG
Abstract. Supermodularity, or complementarity, is a popular concept in economics which
can characterize many objective functions, including utility, social welfare, and production
functions. Further, supermodular dominance captures a preference for greater interdepen-
dence among inputs of those functions, and it can be applied to examine which input set
would produce higher expected utility, social welfare, or production. However, contrary to
the profuse literature on supermodularity, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
work on either testing or empirical analysis for supermodular dominance. In this paper, we
propose a consistent test for a useful implication of supermodular dominance and suggest a
correlation dominance testing for Gaussian random variables as a special case. The test is
based on a novel bootstrap critical value, which has potentially enhanced power performance
by exploiting the information on the contact set on which the null hypothesis is binding. We
also conduct Monte Carlo simulations to explore the finite sample performance of our tests.
We then apply our test to analyze two economic questions. We first investigate whether the
interdependence of stock returns among major firms has increased after the COVID-19, and
find evidence supporting this conjecture. We also compare the interdependence of patent
citations depending on distance, where greater interdependence can imply greater expected
social welfare effect. The results suggest that, in most cases, between-state citations seem
to have greater interdependence than within-state citations, implying that lively interaction
between firms across states might engender greater expected social welfare than knowledge
spillover within a geographically confined area.
Keywords: Supermodularity, Supermodular Dominance, Stochastic Dominance, Bootstrap,
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1. Introduction
The concept of supermodularity has been widely used in economics to analyze how one
agent’s decision affects the incentive of the others. It is often called strategic complemen-
tarity, indicating that agents’ strategies are complements to each other. In economics, many
objective functions including utility, social welfare, and production functions, can be regarded
as supermodular (or submodular1) functions. For instance, as Meyer and Strulovici (2017)
pointed out, any financial loss function that is convex is supermodular in the individual
losses. Another example includes a submodular production function, which appears when an
increase in a firm’s output has a negative effect on the outputs of the other firms. In general,
supermodularity of a function is closely linked to positive interdependence among inputs.
Likewise, supermodular dominance, or supermodular ordering, is a general notion to cap-
ture preference for greater interdependence among inputs of those functions. It is an ordering
between two sets of variables based on the ordering of the expected values of the variables
evaluated with supermodular functions, details of which will be reviewed in Section 2. Thus,
supermodular dominance can be applied to examine which input set would produce higher
expected utility, social welfare, or production, a question of great interest in many areas of
economics.
In this paper, we propose a formal test of an implication of supermodular dominance
that is consistent against general alternatives. The test is based on a necessary condition of
supermodular dominance, so that rejecting the test would imply that the underlying variables
do not characterize supermodular ordering. We also suggest a test of correlation dominance,
which is a special case of the supermodular dominance when the underlying variables are
Gaussian. The limiting null distributions of our test statistics are shown to be non-pivotal
and we propose a novel bootstrap critical value, which has a potentially enhanced power
property by exploiting the information on the contact set on which the null hypothesis is
binding.
We then investigate the finite sample performance of our tests by Monte Carlo simulations.
The simulation designs include weakly dependent and strictly stationary data as well as
1A function f is submodular if −f is supermodular.
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independently and identically distributed multivariate normal data. In both cases, we confirm
that our tests have reasonably good size and power performance under various settings.
Finally, we present two economic applications of our test. We first investigate whether the
interdependence between the standardized stock returns of major firms have increased before
and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Our tests suggest evidence in favor of this conjecture,
on par with our intuition. We also compare the interdependence of patent citations based on
distance, using patent citation data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
where greater interdependence can imply greater expected social welfare effect. The results
suggest that, in most cases, between-state citations seem to have greater interdependence
than within-state citations, indicating that lively interaction among firms across broad areas
can engender higher expected social welfare than knowledge spillover, measured by patent
citation, within a geographically confined area.
Literature Review. There is an extensive literature on supermodularity or complemen-
tarity in various branches of economics including game theory, macroeconomics, and com-
parative statics analysis. For instance, games with strategic complementarity, those wherein
the best response of a player increases in another agent’s strategy, gained interest starting
from Topkis (1979), Vives (1985), and Vives (1990). Vives (1990) proposes a method to
analyze Nash equilibria in noncooperative games utilizing lattice theory which best works in
the presence of strategic complementarities. Vives (2005) also gives an introduction to the
analysis of supermodular games and applies the result to the issues of industrial organization.
Among the literature on comparative statics, Athey (2002) mentions that the robustness of
comparative statics in economic theory is guaranteed by the (log-)supermodularity of prim-
itive functions such as utility functions and probability distributions. Amir (2005) gives a
non-technical survey.
In macroeconomics, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996) provide theoretical propositions along
with empirical evidence that, in the presence of complementarity, agents will show positive
co-movement and have synchronized decisions, and aggregate shocks will be magnified and
propagated. Acemoglu and Azar (2020) develop a model of endogenous production net-
works and show that supermodularity in all arguments of the production function implies
3
the technology-price single-crossing condition, which implies that a positive technology shock
or a reduction in distortions encourages technology adoption by all industries.
In finance, supermodularity plays an important role in providing general bounds on the
price of stochastic annuities, Goovaerts and Dhaene (1999), and multiasset options such as
basket or spread options, Rapuch and Roncalli (2004). In the Brownian motion (or Gaussian
random variable) case it is known that the supermodular ordering of payoffs with identical
marginals is equivalent to the ordering of the pairwise correlations, Muller and Scarsini
(2000, Theorem 4.2). Kızıldemir and Privault (2015) and Kızıldemir (2017) showed that
these conditions are also necessary and sufficient conditions for supermodular ordering of
Poisson random vectors and extended the sufficiency results to a much larger family that
captures the prototypical jump diffusion models widely used in the option pricing literature.
Relative to the profuse references on supermodularity, supermodular dominance has re-
ceived little attention in the literature. Meyer and Strulovici (2017), in their pioneering
research, study interdependence in economic settings using supermodular objective functions
and suggest possible applications to various economic questions. However, there appears to
be no existing statistical inference procedure available for supermodular dominance, partially
because there is lack of the necessary and sufficient condition for the concept. Moreover, we
have not been able to find any empirical studies that test for supermodularity or supermod-
ular dominance using actual economic data. Our paper tries to fill this gap.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review basic concepts and necessary
conditions of supermodular dominance. Section 3 formulates the hypotheses of interest,
introduces the test statistics, and defines bootstrap critical values. Section 4 discusses a
test of correlation dominance for Gaussian random variables. Section 5 reports the Monte
Carlo simulation results, and Section 6 presents two empirical applications. Section 7 is a
conclusion. Finally, Appendix provides proofs of the main theorems.
2. Supermodular dominance
In this section, we review some basic concepts. A set X ⊂ RK is called a lattice if
x ∧ x′ ∈ X and x ∨ x′ ∈ X for any x, x′ ∈ X .2
2x ∧ x′ and x ∨ x′ denote the element-wise minimum and element-wise maximum of two vectors x and
x′, respectively.
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Definition 2.1. A function f : X → R is supermodular on a lattice X if for any x, x′ ∈ X ,
f(x) + f(x′) ≤ f(x ∧ x′) + f(x ∨ x′).
For a twice continuously differentiable f , supermodularity of f corresponds to non-negative
cross-partial derivatives between all possible pairs of inputs, i.e.,
∂2f(x1, . . . , xK)
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j.
Let X = (X1, . . . , XK)
ᵀ and Y = (Y1, . . . , YK)
ᵀ denote two random vectors in RK .
Definition 2.2. Y supermodularly dominates X, denoted X ≤sm Y , if
Ef(X) ≤ Ef(Y )
for all measurable, supermodular functions f : RK → R for which the expectations exist.3
It is well known that, so far, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions found for
supermodular dominance, but there are several implications at hand. The following lemma
states some necessary conditions of the supermodular dominance proved by Bäuerle (1997):4
Lemma 2.1. If X ≤sm Y, then
1) Xi
d
= Yi for each i = 1, . . . , K. (1)
2) max{X1, . . . , XK} ≥st max{Y1, . . . , YK} and min{X1, . . . , XK} ≤st min{Y1, . . . , YK}.
3) (Xi1 , . . . , Xik) ≤sm (Yi1 , . . . , Yik) ∀ 1 ≤ i1 < ... < ik ≤ K.
Condition 1) implies that the variables in the supermodular dominance relationship have the
same marginal distributions. Combining 2) and 3), we obtain
max{Xi1 , . . . , Xik} ≥st max{Yi1 , . . . , Yik} and
min{Xi1 , . . . , Xik} ≤st min{Yi1 , . . . , Yik} (2)
3The usual first order stochastic dominance of Y over X, denoted X ≤st Y , holds if the same inequality
is satisfied for all measurable, increasing functions f : RK → R for which the expectations exist.
4For any two random variables X and Y , we denote X
d
= Y when X and Y have the same marginal
distribution.
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for all 1 ≤ i1 < ... < ik ≤ K, k = 1, . . . , K, which is the main implication of our interest.
That is, if there is supermodular dominance between two random vectors, the maximum of the
elements of the supermodularly dominated random vector first order stochastically dominates
that of the supermodularly dominating random vector for all possible combinations of the
elements, and vice versa for the minimum.
Depending on the purpose of the research, one can test (2) for its own implication or
test supermodular dominance by testing both (1) and (2) and see if both of them are sat-
isfied. Since there are many existing tests for the equality of the distributions (1), e.g.,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, below we shall focus on consistent testing for the
property (2).
3. Testing for an implication of supermodular dominance
3.1. Hypotheses of Interest and the Test Statistic. In this section, we formulate the
hypotheses of interest and define our test statistic.
Let I = {(i1, . . . , ik) ∈ Zk+ : 1 ≤ i1 < ... < ik ≤ K, k = 1, . . . , K} denote the set of
k-tuples of positive integers. For each i ∈ I, let FUi and GUi denote the distributions of
max{Xi1 , . . . , Xik} and max{Yi1 , . . . , Yik}, respectively. Similarly, we denote FLi and GLi to
be the distributions of min{Xi1 , . . . , Xik} and min{Yi1 , . . . , Yik}, respectively.
Let
DUi (x) := F
U
i (x)−GUi (x); DLi (x) := GLi (x)− FLi (x). (3)
The hypotheses of interest are as follows:
H0 : D
U
i (x) ≤ 0 and DLi (x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X and i ∈ I, (4)
H1 : Negation of H0.
In this formulation, rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that Y does not supermodularly
dominate X, while failing to reject the null implies that there is not enough evidence against
the necessary condition for the supermodular dominance of Y over X.
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{[DUi (x)]2+ + [DLi (x)]2+}dx. (5)
Then, the hypotheses of interest can be equivalently stated as
H0 : d0 = 0 vs. H0 : d0 > 0. (6)
Let Xt = (X1,t, . . . , XK,t)
ᵀ and Yt = (Y1,t, . . . , YK,t)
ᵀ for t = 1, . . . , T , where {Xi,t : t =
1, . . . , T} and {Yi,t : t = 1, . . . , T} denote the sample realizations of Xi and Yi, respectively,
for i = 1, . . . , K. We impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.1. (a) {(Xt,Yt) : t ≥ 1} is a strictly stationary and strong mixing sequence
with coefficients {α(s) : s ≥ 1} satisfying
∑∞
s=1 s
Q−1α(s)γ/(Q+γ) < ∞ for some even integer
Q > 2 + γ and some γ > 0. (b) The distributions of (Xi1,t, . . . , Xik,t) and (Yi1,t, . . . , Yik,t)
have bounded densities with respect to Lebesgue measure for each (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ I.






{[D̂Ui (x)]2+ + [D̂Li (x)]2+}dx,
where D̂Ui (x) := F̂
U
i (x) − ĜUi (x) and D̂Li (x) := ĜLi (x) − F̂Li (x), with F̂Ui , ĜUi , F̂Li , and ĜLi
denoting the empirical distribution functions of max{Xi1,t, . . . , Xik,t}, max{Yi1,t, . . . , Yik,t},
min{Xi1,t, . . . , Xik,t}, and min{Yi1,t, . . . , Yik,t}, respectively.








jointly for all i ∈ I, where D̂i(·) = (D̂Ui (·), D̂Li (·))ᵀ, Di(·) = (DUi (·), DLi (·))ᵀ, and νi(·) =
(νUi (·), νLi (·))ᵀ is a mean zero Gaussian process with covariance kernel C(x1, x2) = Eνi(x1)νi(x2)ᵀ
(Lemma A1 in Appendix).
A decision rule of the test would be rejecting H0 if ST > cT,α where cT,α is a critical value
that will be discussed in the next section. Since the asymptotic null distribution of the test
statistic depends on the true DGPs, we suggest resampling methods to compute the critical
values.
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3.2. Bootstrap Critical Values. We assume that the observations are weakly dependent
and strictly stationary with arbitrary contemporaneous dependence. To compute the critical
values, we therefore consider the stationary bootstrap procedure (Politis and Romano, 1994a)
applicable to time series settings.
Let W = (W1, . . . ,WT )




ᵀ ∈ R2K , Xt = (X1,t, . . . , XK,t)ᵀ and Yt = (Y1,t, . . . , YK,t)ᵀ for t = 1, . . . , T . Let
Bi,l := (Wi,Wi+1, . . . ,Wi+l−1)
ᵀ denote the block (i.e., submatrix) of W that starts from the
i-th row and has a total of l rows. When j > T, we let Wj = Wj(mod T ) and W0 = WT .
Let {Li : i ≥ 1} denote a sequence of block lengths,5 which are iid random variables
independent of W having a geometric distribution with a scalar parameter p ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
P (Li = l) = (1− p)l−1p for l = 1, 2, . . . ; i ≥ 1.
We assume that the parameter p satisfies the following growth condition:
Assumption 3.2. p+ (
√
Tp)−1 →∞.
Let {Ii : i ≥ 1} be iid random variables independent of W and Li’s, having a uniform
distribution on {1, . . . , T}, i.e.,
P (Ii = s) =
1
T
for s = 1, 2, . . . , T ; i ≥ 1.





, . . . , BᵀIk,Lk
)ᵀ
:= (W∗1, . . . ,W
∗
T )
ᵀ as our bootstrap sample,




ᵀ)ᵀ, X∗t = (X
∗
1,t, . . . , X
∗
K,t)
ᵀ and Y∗t = (Y
∗
1,t, . . . , Y
∗
K,t)
ᵀ, i.e., the first L1
rows of W∗ are BI1,L1 , the next L2 rows are BI2,L2 , and so on. This procedure is stopped
when total T observations are generated for each column, and we discard the remaining.
Politis and Romano (1994a) show that W∗ is stationary, conditional on W.


















i can be defined.
5If the data are independently and identically distributed, then we may take Li = 1, which essentially
leads to the standard nonparametric bootstrap.
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{[D̂U∗i (x)− D̂Ui (x)]2+ + [D̂L∗i (x)− D̂Li (x)]2+}dx, (7)
where D̂U∗i (x) := F̂
U∗
i (x) − ĜU∗i (x) and D̂L∗i (x) := ĜL∗i (x) − F̂L∗i (x). Then, the LFC-based
bootstrap critical value c∗T,α,LF is defined to be the (1−α) quantile of the bootstrap distribution
of Ŝ∗,LFT .
However, the test statistics based on the LFC-based bootstrap critical value can be too
conservative, mainly because the null hypothesis (4) may comprise of a large number of in-
equalities restrictions (especially when K is large) and only a few of them may be binding. In
this paper, we propose a bootstrap critical value with potentially enhanced power properties
by exploiting the information on the contact set over which the inequalities are binding. 6.
For positive sequences {(aT,1, aT,2) : T ≥ 1}, let
Bi,1 = {x ∈ X : |DUi (x)| ≤ aT,1 and DLi (x) < −aT,2}, (8)
Bi,2 = {x ∈ X : |DLi (x)| ≤ aT,1 and DUi (x) < −aT,2}, (9)
Bi,3 = {x ∈ X : |DUi (x)| ≤ aT,1 and |DLi (x)| ≤ aT,1}, (10)
denote the (population) contact sets, where DUi and D
L
i are as defined in (3).
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Suppose further that aT,1, aT,2 are positive


















{[D̂Ui (x)]2+ + [D̂Li (x)]2+}dx
)}
→ 1.
Lemma 3.1 shows that, under the null hypothesis, the test statistic ST can be approximated
by the sum of the integrals with domains restricted to the contact sets with probability that
goes to one as the sample size goes to infinity. This suggests that we may consider a bootstrap
procedure that mimics the approximate representation of ST in Lemma 3.1.




B̂i,1 = {x ∈ X : |D̂Ui (x)| < âT and D̂Li (x) < −âT},
B̂i,2 = {x ∈ X : |D̂Li (x)| < âT and D̂Ui (x) < −âT},
B̂i,3 = {x ∈ X : |D̂Ui (x)| < âT and |D̂Li (x)| < âT}.
denote the estimated contact sets, where {âT : T ≥ 1} is a positive (possibly stochastic)
sequence that satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 3.3. For each T ≥ 1, there exist non-stochastic sequences aT,1, aT,2 > 0 such
that aT,1 ≤ aT,2 and
P {aT,1 ≤ âT ≤ aT,2} → 1 and aT,1
√
T + a−1T,2 →∞ as T →∞.






[D̂U∗i (x)− D̂Ui (x)]2+dx+
∫
B̂i,2




{[D̂U∗i (x)− D̂Ui (x)]2+ + [D̂L∗i (x)− D̂Li (x)]2+}dx
)
. (11)
It can be easily seen that the modified bootstrap statistic 11 is generally smaller than the LFC
based bootstrap statistic 7, because the estimated contact sets are subsets of X . Therefore, it
allows employing smaller critical values that the LFC based critical values without sacrificing
the size, which in turn enhances the power performance of the test.
Let S∗T be the (1− α) quantile from the bootstrap distribution S∗T . In some interior cases
of the null hypothesis, both the original test statistic ST and the modified bootstrap statistic
S∗T may degenerate to zero as the sample size increases. To control the size, therefore, we
suggest taking the bootstrap critical value as the maximum of S∗T and an arbitrary small
positive constant:
c∗T,α,η = max{c∗T,α, η},
where η = 10−6 is a small fixed number. The decision rule of the test is to reject the null




The following theorem shows that our test has asymptotically correct size under the null
hypothesis7 and is consistent against the fixed alternative hypothesis.



















4. Testing for correlation dominance
In this section, we consider a test of correlation dominance, which is a special case of the
supermodular dominance when the random variables are Gaussian.
Let X = (X1, . . . , XK)
ᵀ ∈ RK and Y = (Y1, . . . , YK)ᵀ ∈ RK be two Gaussian random
vectors with the same marginal distributions Xi
d
= Yi, i = 1, . . . , K. Then, by Müller and
Scarsini (2000, Theorem 4.2), we have X ≤sm Y if and only if,
cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ cov(Yi, Yj) ∀i, j = 1, .., K; i 6= j. (12)
We say that Y correlation dominates X, or X ≤cd Y , when (12) holds.
Let {Xi,t : t = 1, . . . , T} and {Yi,t : t = 1, . . . , T} be the sample realizations of Xi and




















Ȳi)(Yj,t− Ȳj), Ȳi = 1T
∑T
t=1 Yi,t for i, j = 1, . . . , K. Using a standard argument, it can be seen
that the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic CT under (the least favorable case of)
the null hypothesis (12) is a maximum of Gaussian distributions.
7Under additional regularity conditions, we may show that the test has asymptotically correct size uni-
formly under the null hypothesis. For brevity, we do not discuss the result in this paper.
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We consider the following bootstrap test statistic based on the bootstrap sample W∗


















i,j(Y ) is defined
similarly. The bootstrap critical value with nominal significance level α is defined to be the
(1− α) quantile of the bootstrap distribution of C∗T .8
5. Monte Carlo simulations
In this section, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations to explore the finite sample perfor-
mance of our test. In our simulations, we consider both iid data and serially dependent
data.
5.1. IID data. We randomly generate T samples of vectors of dimension K = 3 from the
following multivariate normal (MVN) distributions:
X ∼MVN(0,ΣX),
Y ∼MVN(0,ΣY ). (14)
We consider several cases to examine the size and power of our test. In Case 1, both X
and Y follow the multivariate standard normal distribution (14) with ΣX = ΣY = IK . In
other cases, we vary the covariances to modify the dependence structure. In Case 2, the
off-diagonals of ΣX are set to a positive constant in {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}, so that X supermodularly
dominates Y . In Case 3, the off-diagonals of ΣX move between ±0.2 or ±0.4 in an orderly
fashion. In both Cases 2 and 3, we expect the rejection rates to increase as the covariances
differ greater from 0. Case 4 varies from Case 2 in that some of the off-diagonals of ΣX are
set to zero. This mimics the situation where there is a non-negligible contact set, i.e., the
tangent area between the null and alternative hypothesis. Therefore, we expect to reject the
null hypothesis in Case 2 to 4. Finally, in Case 5, the covariances of Y are equal to 0.35 so
8It would also be possible to define a modified bootstrap test statistic utilizing the information on the
binding inequalities, similar to (11). Since the correlation dominance test can be used as a preliminary
screening tool and such an extension complicates the exposition, we do not discuss the case in this paper.
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that Y has strict supermodular dominance over X, which characterizes an interior case of
























with x = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and y = 0.2, 0.4, where the superscripts denote the corresponding cases.
ΣX and ΣY in other cases are identity matrices.
5.1.1. Simulation Results. We take B = 500 bootstrap repetitions and R = 1, 000 simulation
replications, and consider the sample size T ∈ {100, 500}. Since we are considering a multi-
variate standard normal distribution along with its variations, a grid of values is selected on
the interval [-2.5, 2.5] such that −2.5 = t0 < t1 < ... < tn = 2.5. The number of gridpoints
is fixed at n = 40.
We take the nominal significance level α = 0.05. As the tuning parameter for the
contact set approach, we take aT = a0T
−1/2 log(log(T )). In the simulations, we consider
a0 ∈ {0.6, . . . , 1.0} to see the robustness of the results with respect to the choice of the
tuning parameter constant.
Table 1 summarizes the simulation results. BS and BS C refer to the tests with the LFC-
based bootstrap critical value c∗T,α,LF and the contact set-based bootstrap critical value c
∗
T,α,η,
respectively. In Case 1, the rejection probabilities are close to the nominal significance level,
confirming that our test has reasonably good size in finite samples. In Case 2, as expected,
the rejection rates increase as x = (ΣX)ij changes from 0.1 to 0.5, or as the sample size T
increases. In Case 3, we have a similar finding: the power increases as the distance between
the null and alternative models increases or the sample size increases. In Case 4, we find
that the contact set based bootstrap critical values give significantly higher power than the
LFC-based critical values, which is consistent with our theoretical results. In Case 5, as
expected, the rejection probabilities of BS C are closer to the nominal size than BS, which
implies that BS C test is asymptotically similar over a wider set of null distributions than
BS.
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Table 1. Rejection Probabilities of ST : IID Data
a0 = 0.6 a0 = 0.7
T 100 500 100 500
BS BS C BS BS C BS BS C BS BS C
Case 1 0.054 0.124 0.041 0.079 0.048 0.091 0.044 0.077
Case 2: x = 0.1 0.094 0.197 0.183 0.306 0.099 0.186 0.205 0.282
Case 2: x = 0.3 0.330 0.544 0.988 0.999 0.310 0.463 0.991 0.997
Case 2: x = 0.5 0.829 0.950 1.000 1.000 0.814 0.914 1.000 1.000
Case 3: y = 0.2 0.075 0.177 0.246 0.374 0.090 0.162 0.244 0.331
Case 3: y = 0.4 0.218 0.431 0.964 0.995 0.211 0.358 0.961 0.993
Case 4 0.205 0.378 0.917 0.969 0.217 0.355 0.916 0.961
Case 5 0.010 0.037 0.002 0.011 0.011 0.042 0.001 0.013
a0 = 0.8 a0 = 0.9
T 100 500 100 500
BS BS C BS BS C BS BS C BS BS C
Case 1 0.049 0.088 0.046 0.070 0.056 0.084 0.047 0.061
Case 2: x = 0.1 0.078 0.123 0.170 0.211 0.088 0.120 0.192 0.206
Case 2: x = 0.3 0.319 0.405 0.987 0.991 0.319 0.383 0.989 0.991
Case 2: x = 0.5 0.832 0.899 1.000 1.000 0.806 0.856 1.000 1.000
Case 3: y = 0.2 0.086 0.125 0.212 0.278 0.105 0.142 0.221 0.253
Case 3: y = 0.4 0.185 0.282 0.968 0.986 0.223 0.292 0.965 0.978
Case 4 0.190 0.293 0.890 0.927 0.189 0.260 0.917 0.948
Case 5 0.009 0.020 0.000 0.011 0.010 0.021 0.003 0.007
a0 = 1.0
T 100 500
BS BS C BS BS C
Case 1 0.047 0.059 0.054 0.061
Case 2: x = 0.1 0.089 0.112 0.196 0.200
Case 2: x = 0.3 0.330 0.361 0.986 0.987
Case 2: x = 0.5 0.831 0.862 1.000 1.000
Case 3: y = 0.2 0.079 0.101 0.205 0.223
Case 3: y = 0.4 0.229 0.263 0.973 0.976
Case 4 0.173 0.204 0.931 0.943
Case 5 0.007 0.018 0.004 0.009
Table 2. Rejection Probabilities of CT : IID Data
T 100 250 500
Case 1 0.076 0.070 0.052
Case 2: x = 0.1 0.206 0.403 0.633
Case 2: x = 0.3 0.871 0.999 1.000
Case 2: x = 0.5 0.999 1.000 1.000
Case 3: y = 0.2 0.463 0.846 0.982
Case 3: y = 0.4 0.980 1.000 1.000
Case 4 0.955 1.000 1.000
Case 5 0 0 0
We next provide the simulation results of the correlation dominance test CT . Table 2
summarizes the rejection probabilities. Overall, the test has reasonably good size and power
performances in finite samples.
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5.2. Dependent data. We next consider the cases where observations for X and Y are mu-
tually and serially dependent. For this purpose, we generate Wt = (X1,t, . . . , XK,t, Y1,t, . . . , YKt)
ᵀ ∈
R2K as follows:
Wt = AWt−1 + εt, t = 1, . . . T,
with W0 = 0, where A = diag{ρ, . . . , ρ} is a 2K × 2K diagonal matrix, and εi is a 2K ×
1 vector randomly generated from the multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance-covariance matrix Σε = (γij) with γii = 1.
To investigate the size performance of the test, we set ρ = 0.3 and take γij = 0.2
for all i 6= j. On the other hand, for the power performance, we vary the values of
γcov := γij, i 6= j, so that the covariances between the elements of Xt = (X1,t, ..., XK,t)ᵀ
are greater than those of Yt = (Y1,t, ..., YK,t)
ᵀ. The extent to which we deviate from the null
hypothesis of supermodular (and correlation) dominance is characterized by the parameter
γcov ∈ {0.3, 0.5}.9 For other parameters, we take B (number of bootstrap repetition) = 500,
R (number of simulation repetition) = 1000, T ∈ {100, 250, 500}, a0 ∈ {1.0, 1.1, 1.2} and
1/p ∈ {5, 15}.
Table 3 summarizes the size and the power of the test ST . Overall, it shows that our test
has reasonably good performance under various settings and the test BS C is more powerful
than BS especially when the value of a0 is smaller, as expected.
Tabel 4 summarizes the size and the power of the test CT for the same parameter setting.
As before, the finite sample performance of the correlation test seems reasonably good.
6. Applications
In this section, we apply our tests to two empirical questions. Since we will consider time
series data, we use the stationary bootstrap to obtain the bootstrap critical values.
6.1. Stock returns of major firms before and after the COVID-19. Big Tech, also
known as the Tech Giants or the Big Five are the largest and most dominant companies in
the information technology industry of the United States: Amazon (AMZN), Apple (AAPL),
Alphabet (GOOG), Facebook (FB), and Microsoft (MSFT). For the last ten years, these five
have been the most valuable public companies globally, with market capitalizations reaching
9In specific, we partition the variance covariance matrix into four rectangles and set the off-diagonals of
the upper left partition as γcov, that of the lower right partition as 0.1, and the rest as 0.05.
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Table 3. Rejection Probabilities of the test ST : Dependent Data
1/p = 5
a0=1.0 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.086 0.066 0.07 0.213 0.302 0.505 0.517 0.912 1
BS C 0.12 0.08 0.078 0.253 0.327 0.539 0.555 0.929 1
a0=1.1 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.086 0.063 0.072 0.211 0.31 0.562 0.531 0.905 1
BS C 0.104 0.068 0.078 0.245 0.331 0.575 0.572 0.912 1
a0=1.2 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.08 0.071 0.073 0.204 0.309 0.527 0.527 0.919 1
BS C 0.086 0.077 0.074 0.223 0.313 0.529 0.55 0.921 1
1/p = 15
a0=1.0 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.113 0.073 0.062 0.264 0.293 0.51 0.565 0.9 1
BS C 0.134 0.087 0.07 0.293 0.319 0.549 0.617 0.921 1
a0=1.1 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.123 0.087 0.059 0.247 0.282 0.531 0.614 0.884 0.999
BS C 0.14 0.099 0.064 0.276 0.304 0.551 0.652 0.896 1
a0=1.2 H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
T 100 250 500 100 250 500 100 250 500
BS 0.124 0.061 0.052 0.274 0.299 0.52 0.59 0.893 0.998
BS C 0.132 0.063 0.055 0.28 0.303 0.525 0.606 0.9 0.998
Table 4. Rejection Probabilities of the test CT : Dependent Data
1/p=5
T H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
100 0.076 0.670 0.994
250 0.058 0.929 1.000
500 0.057 0.998 1.000
1/p=15
T H0 H1: γcov = 0.3 H1: γcov = 0.5
100 0.113 0.737 0.995
250 0.081 0.941 1.000
500 0.069 0.998 1.000
over $2.0 trillion. They now collectively represent 25% of the market value of the S&P500
index.
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world economy. Many stock markets around
the world suffered big drops in value at various points during the pandemic, but Big Tech
seems to keep on growing in importance, since many more transactions are taking place
online rather than face-to-face. We investigate how the Big Five stock prices fared during
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2019 and 2020. According to the WHO, the pandemic started on December 31st 2019, and
so we interpret 2020 as pandemic related and 2019 as pre-pandemic. Although the US did
not suffer many cases until March 2020, the Big Five receive much of their earnings from
international sources and so the calendar year division seems reasonable.
We consider their daily closing prices during 2019 and 2020. We calculate the return
matrices R2019and R2020with 254 × 5 and 178 × 5 dimensions. Below we report the sample
moments of the daily returns from the two years.
There seems to be some indication that the mean returns have increased in 2020, although
the volatility has also increased. There does not seem to be a common pattern in the behavior
of the higher cumulants. We test whether the means have changed significantly using the
Hotelling statistic







where Ti, i = 1, 2is the number of observations in each year. The value is 2.773, which is not
significant compared with the critical value from X 2(5).We also considered the standard event
study methodology, where we compute abnormal return for 2020 as ARk,t = Rk,t− µ̂2019,t and
the cumulative abnormal return as
∑t
s=1ARk,s. To set the confidence bars we used the 2020
standard deviations. Figure 1 shows that there was an early negative effect of the pandemic
on the stock returns of each company but they mostly stayed within the confidence bands.
The sample correlation matrices for X = R2019
10 and Y = R2020are, respectively,
σ̂X =
AMZN AAPL GOOG FB MSFT

1.000 0.578 0.493 0.509 0.548 AMZN
0.578 1.000 0.685 0.545 0.741 AAPL
0.493 0.685 1.000 0.549 0.675 GOOG
0.509 0.545 0.549 1.000 0.602 FB
0.548 0.741 0.675 0.602 1.000 MSFT
,
10We take 178 returns backwards from December 2019 to construct R2019.
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Figure 1. Abnormal returns in 2020
σ̂Y =

1.000 0.684 0.788 0.794 0.861
0.684 1.000 0.660 0.710 0.733
0.788 0.660 1.000 0.825 0.778
0.794 0.710 0.825 1.000 0.872
0.861 0.733 0.778 0.872 1.000

.
We can observe that most of the off-diagonal entries have changed to more positive correla-
tion. Thus, the values of sample correlations appear to be consistent with the null hypothesis
of correlation dominance cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ cov(Yi, Yj) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 5. To verify this,
we perform the correlation dominance test CTand the supermodular dominance test ST to
X = R2019 and Y = R2020. As can be seen from Figure 2, we cannot reject the null of
cov(Xi, Xj) ≤ cov(Yi, Yj) while we do reject the null of cov(Yi, Yj) ≤ cov(Xi, Xj) in most
cases.
Since we use daily data, there may some concern about microstructure noise and its effects
on our estimated covariance matrix. Therefore, we consider a multivariate version of the Roll
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Figure 2. p-values of the correlation dominance test CT












where Qitis the trade direction indicator, which is assumed for now to be iid with +1 and -1
equally likely and si are the individual spreads. Then




which implies that observed returns rit = ∆pitare autocorrelated like an MA(1)process. We
can identify si, σ
2
εifrom the variance and autocovariance of observed returns asset by asset as
was done in the original Roll paper. We consider the multivariate extension of this where we
suppose that for any assets i, jthe order flow is potentially contemporaneously correlated so
that
E (QitQjt) = ωij,
and we suppose that the efficient returns are themselves contemporaneously correlated with























if j = 1
0 if j > 1,
,
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where  denotes the matrix Hadamard product. Therefore, it follows that
Σ = E(rtr
ᵀ





The efficient covariance matrices of X and Y estimated based on (15) are as follows:
Σ̂X =

0.923 0.572 0.379 0.335 0.449
0.572 0.979 0.740 0.465 0.598
0.379 0.740 0.834 0.388 0.579
0.335 0.465 0.388 0.936 0.557




0.409 0.174 0.229 0.145 0.127
0.174 0.637 0.189 0.302 0.198
0.229 0.189 0.555 0.263 0.117
0.145 0.302 0.263 0.285 0.083
0.127 0.198 0.117 0.083 0.082

.
We can see that Σ̂Y differs more from σ̂Y than Σ̂X does from σ̂X . We conduct the correlation
dominance test (denoted E BS) based on Σ̂X and Σ̂Y and Figure 2 shows the resulting p-
values for various stationary bootstrap parameters.
This phenomenon has been remarked upon before during other crisis periods, for example
Morgan (2010) discussed the so-called correlation bubble that was experienced during the
GFC. We have found evidence of a very strong effect whereby the pairwise correlations
between these pivotal companies have uniformly increased between 2019 and 2020.
Given the correlation dominance results, we further test if there is a significant evidence of
supermodular dominance. We used a0 = 0.9 and the resulting p-values are plotted in Figure
3.11 We find evidence in favor of X ≤sm Y because we can reject the null of Y ≤sm X, while
we do not reject the null of X ≤sm Y across different choices of the stationary bootstrap
parameters.
6.2. Knowledge spillover depending on distance. In this subsection, we compare the
effect of geographic and distant knowledge spillover, measured by patent citations, on social
welfare. The issue of geographic knowledge spillover has received considerable attention in the
literature; Black (2005) provides an extensive summary of the relationship between geography
and innovation, see chapter 3 of this book for details. Some of the literature focusses on patent
citations as a measure of knowledge spillover, including Jaffe et. al. (2000) who used the
survey method to verify if patent citations can be an indicator of knowledge spillover. They
11The results are robust to the various choices of a0 we considered.
20
Figure 3. p-values of the supermodular dominance test ST
imply that the aggregate citation flows can serve as proxies for the intensity of knowledge
spillover between groups of organizations or between countries. Jaffe et. al. (1993) also found
evidence that in the U.S., citations to patents are geographically localized and these effects
are quite large and quite statistically significant. They compare the frequency of localized
citing between the original patents and the citing patents with that between the original
patents and control group. Here, the control groups consist of patents with the same class
and application year, and thus have the same temporal and technological distributions, with
each citing patent. They found that citations are quantitatively and statistically significantly
more localized than the controls.
While they approached this by manually matching a control group to the original patents,
we believe that directly comparing localized and distant citing could provide a novel per-
spective to the literature. Therefore, we focus on comparing the effect of geographic and
distant knowledge spillovers, measured by patent citations, on social welfare. Although the
previous research matches temporal distributions of different patents only by their assigned
dates, we directly utilize the overtime distributions of distant and localized citations on a
monthly level, and test their equivalences by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We also match
the technological distributions of patents by comparing those with the same subclass, which
is a four-digit classification of patent characteristics.
Theoretically, let fbe a supermodular, monotone, and symmetric social welfare function.
Then if either localized or distant citing supermodularly dominates the other, by the definition
21
of supermodular dominance, it is expected to engender higher social welfare, i.e., Ef(X) ≤
Ef(Y )holds for respective Xand Y . We will test the hypotheses of both directions; one that
tests the dominance of localized citing, and the other that tests the dominance of distant
citing, to see if the result is reverted. If we reject in one case and fail to do so in another case,
then we could conclude that there is indirect evidence of the supermodular dominance existing
between the numbers of citations coming from within and outside of the state. In this case,
by the definition of supermodular dominance, we can conjecture that Ef(X) ≤ Ef(Y )or
Ef(Y ) ≤ Ef(X)holds for supermodular, monotone, and symmetric social welfare function
f , and thus, either localized or distant citing might engender greater expected social welfare
than the other.
The data is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent
Database. The NBER patent data comprise detail information on millions of U.S. patents,
including patent number, date of assignment, assignee ID, country, state, and city of inven-
tors, category12 and subclass13 of patents, citing patents, etc. There have been enormous
efforts to increase the usability of this data set and among them we use Lee (2019) which
provides information for patents assigned from 1976 to 2017. We drop the data with missing
state and assignee ID information and confine our interest to the 50 American states.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the rank of the 50 states by the total
number of patents, and the number of patents assigned in total and by patent category.
Here, and throughout this paper, the location of a patent is identified as that of the first
inventor of the patent. Out of the 50 American states, the top five states that have issued the
most patents over the time period of the data are California (CA), New York (NY), Texas
(TX), Massachusetts (MA), and New Jersey (NJ).
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the rank of 50 states by the number of localized
and distant citing. The third and the second columns represent the number of citations from
within state and the rank of states by that, and the last two columns represent those of
citations coming from different states. Overall, the two ranks seem to match closely. CA
12There are six different categories of patents: (1) chemical, (2) computers and communications, (3) drugs
and medical, (4) electrical and electronics, (5) mechanicals, and (6) others.
13The subclass of a patent is defined as the first four letters of International Patent Classification (IPC).
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Table 5. The number of patents assigned in the 50 U.S. states (1976-2017)




1 2 3 4 5 6
CA 1 1,598,717 88,601 652,928 273,735 320,094 205,796 48,565
NY 2 522,921 71,844 150,219 54,419 120,551 102,138 19,918
TX 3 456,013 73,601 157,721 30,924 73,911 106,158 10,698
MA 4 336,669 29,664 95,146 88,890 55,751 52,655 12,506
NJ 5 327,075 67,480 84,292 78,332 37,613 43,479 13,325
MI 6 298,931 41,128 26,619 21,922 38,464 156,149 12,438
IL 7 295,160 47,353 61,659 35,008 39,416 87,898 21,534
PA 8 278,438 57,861 34,305 59,110 46,838 68,099 10,037
WA 9 261,464 11,728 150,752 26,207 30,233 33,908 7,301
OH 10 254,696 64,137 23,909 37,556 27,862 84,661 14,217
MN 11 225,106 29,741 51,472 54,722 28,905 48,349 10,618
FL 12 169,346 16,711 42,830 26,400 26,588 46,065 9,681
NC 13 153,366 14,246 54,494 21,803 22,532 31,673 7,766
CT 14 151,120 20,420 21,466 32,961 24,222 44,113 6,752
CO 15 132,055 10,612 49,846 19,086 22,451 24,217 5,031
WI 16 127,858 17,714 12,284 21,840 17,822 48,315 8,904
IN 17 114,555 14,738 9,449 30,013 17,561 35,751 6,064
AZ 18 114,428 7,558 39,455 8,724 29,870 24,342 3,849
OR 19 112,103 5,260 47,415 6,688 26,099 18,898 7,134
MD 20 108,792 12,046 23,323 31,286 17,986 19,448 3,812
GA 21 99,730 14,801 29,577 11,879 13,584 23,088 6,093
VA 22 92,326 11,509 28,217 8,871 15,560 21,646 5,886
MO 23 67,321 10,736 8,431 15,632 7,869 18,608 5,490
TN 24 57,304 13,375 4,247 12,058 7,010 16,963 3,281
UT 25 56,184 6,457 12,866 11,701 6,438 14,869 3,515
ID 26 55,349 2,630 10,039 1,126 31,092 8,746 1,240
IA 27 48,049 3,544 7,765 5,851 5,295 18,812 6,399
OK 28 44,478 14,785 2,754 2,465 3,951 18,751 1,348
NH 29 44,352 4,058 13,029 5,602 8,170 11,763 1,473
SC 30 42,372 8,869 2,812 3,104 5,341 19,009 2,937
KS 31 35,069 3,470 12,714 3,555 3,305 9,802 1,957
KY 32 35,026 4,927 8,262 3,628 3,503 12,503 1,930
DE 33 34,285 13,873 1,907 7,984 2,616 5,851 1,779
VT 34 32,421 1,352 7,771 1,033 17,320 3,838 894
LA 35 28,088 9,751 1,194 2,752 1,725 10,983 1,449
AL 36 26,536 4,229 4,653 4,242 3,953 8,048 1,215
NM 37 25,045 3,609 4,761 2,515 6,862 6,480 648
NV 38 24,260 1,638 5,365 1,477 2,574 4,289 8,787
RI 39 18,577 2,587 2,676 2,868 3,036 4,895 2,394
NE 40 14,191 1,259 2,388 1,856 2,222 4,912 1,460
WV 41 11,202 5,523 511 922 761 3,027 355
AR 42 10,034 1,413 1,040 1,215 1,249 4,130 926
ME 43 9,789 1,346 1,554 1,118 1,994 3,025 663
MS 44 9,191 1,581 909 1,389 1,114 3,117 1,019
MT 45 7,097 1,172 692 878 688 2,922 701
HI 46 5,029 449 1,049 930 622 1,424 535
ND 47 5,007 609 642 224 473 2,675 348
SD 48 4,513 415 655 499 415 1,957 544
WY 49 3,777 583 475 409 450 1,570 256
AK 50 2,302 300 166 229 190 1,198 190
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Table 6. The number of citations patents received from within and outside
of a state for the 50 U.S. states (1976-2017)
State Rank ss Ncite ss Rank ds Ncite ds
CA 1 742,164 1 497,126
OH 2 161,042 7 70,067
TX 3 135,210 2 208,397
MN 4 126,761 5 142,594
ID 5 86,765 9 51,987
NY 6 80,437 3 204,390
WA 7 80,309 4 154,191
MA 8 51,426 6 75,498
OR 9 39,912 8 69,347
NJ 10 31,493 10 48,066
NV 11 30,485 15 22,701
IL 12 30,224 13 30,697
MI 13 24,285 20 10,069
CT 14 21,295 11 40,017
OK 15 17,497 22 9,296
PA 16 12,652 17 14,626
NC 17 11,186 12 38,673
AZ 18 10,724 14 24,716
WI 19 10,121 21 9,730
IN 20 9,408 23 8,639
FL 21 8,176 16 15,421
CO 22 6,992 19 12,895
UT 23 6,299 24 8,000
GA 24 4,142 27 4,834
IA 25 3,902 29 3,845
NH 26 3,439 31 2,984
MD 27 3,213 26 4,918
VT 28 3,104 18 13,614
VA 29 2,358 30 3,782
TN 30 2,181 25 5,917
MO 31 1,767 28 4,208
DE 32 1,377 33 1,676
RI 33 1,281 34 1,415
KS 34 1,245 32 1,814
SC 35 1,183 35 694
KY 36 595 39 483
NM 37 571 40 352
MT 38 535 36 560
NE 39 511 38 486
LA 40 441 37 495
WV 41 235 43 141
AL 42 170 41 160
AR 43 118 45 61
WY 44 113 44 68
ME 45 95 42 147
ND 46 59 50 13
MS 47 44 46 48
HI 48 32 48 23
SD 49 27 47 29
AK 50 4 49 19
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stands as the top state which have assigned patents that were cited most both from CA itself
and from the other states.
Since a single firm can be located in more than one state and have issued patents of different
subclasses, we take subgroups of firms based on the assignee ID, state, and subclass of patent,
as we mentioned above. Firms are then selected based on this subgroup unit.14 Focusing in
on each state, we gather information on monthly numbers of citations firms received from
the same state and from the other states. In specific, Y = (Y1, . . . , YK)is the collection of
the numbers of citations that Kfirms received from patents assigned in the same state, while
X = (X1, . . . , XK)is the vector of mean citations that the same Kfirms received from the
other states.15 Note that here, xk = (Xk,1, . . . , Xk,T )
ᵀand yk = (Yk,1, . . . , Yk,T )
ᵀdenote the
vectors of numbers of citations of the same firm kfor the months t = 1, . . . , 504(i.e., from
Jan. 1976 to Dec. 2017). We also confine our interest to those firms with at least 5 citations
in total in order to focus on the effect of quality innovation.
For each state, after taking X and Y as described above for each firm, we apply our test
on the numbers of citations, from the same state and the other states, that each firm received
for its patents.16 A grid is selected as follows: 0 to 50 by 1, 51 to 100 by 5, and by 10 after
101. We adopt a grid with denser grid points for lower values because in most cases, the
number of citations a firm received in a month does not exceed a digit. We use stationary
bootstrap critical values with B = 500bootstrap repetitions, a0 = 1.1, and 1/p = 5.
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The above procedure is carried out for the 50 US states. For most states with lower ranks in
terms of the number of patents, we cannot perform the analysis because there is not much firm
with patents that received at least five citations over the time period. Table 7 lists subclasses
and their classifications for which firms satisfy the implications of supermodular dominance
at least in one state. We observe several cases of supermodular dominance holding between
distant and localized citing especially for subclasses that fall under the category of human
14For example, if firm i has issued patents of subclasses s ∈{AB12, CD34} in states NY and OH, then
the four possible subgroups {i, AB12, NY}, {i, AB12, OH}, {i, CD34, NY}, and {i, CD34, NY} are each
treated as different entities, which are each referred to as a firm throughout this paper.
15The mean is taken over the number of states that have at least one record of citing the patents, for each
firm.
16Due to the computational issue, we conduct our analysis on the subclasses which are assigned by no
greater than 10 firms.
17The results are similar under different choices of the tuning parameters.
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Table 7. Classification of subclass with potential supermodular dominance
relationship between distant and localized citings
Classification Subclass
A. Human necessities A01H, A01K, A01N, A01N, A47B, A47L, A61B, A61C,
A61F, A61K, A61L, A61M, A61N, A62B, A63B, A63F
B. Performing operations,
Transporting
B01D, B01J, B01J, B05C, B05D, B08B, B22F, B23K, B23P,
B24B, B25B, B26D, B27C, B29D, B31F, B32B, B32B, B41J,
B60G, B60Q, B60R, B65D, B65H, B82B
C. Chemistry; Metallurgy C01B, C03B, C07C, C07D, C07H, C07K, C08F, C08G, C08J,
C08L, C08L, C09D, C09K, C10G, C10M, C11DC11D, C12N,
C12P, C12Q, C25D, C25F
D. Textiles; Paper D06L, D21F, D21H




F01B, F01N, F02G, F02K, F02M, F15C, F16H, F16J, F16K,
F16L, F21V, F25B
G. Physics G01B, G01K, G01L, G01N, G01R, G01S, G01V, G02B,
G02C, G04C, G05B, G05F, G06F, G06K, G06Q, G06T,
G07F, G08B, G09G, G10L, G11B, G11C
H. Electricity H01C, H01G, H01H, H01J, H01L, H01M, H01Q, H01R,
H02H, H02J, H03K, H03M, H04B, H04J, H04L, H04M,
H04N, H04W, H05B, H05K
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization
necessities, performing operations and transporting, chemistry and metallurgy, physics, and
electricity. Patents whose subclasses are classified as textiles and paper or fixed constructions
constitute relatively limited cases of potential supermodular dominance.
Table 8 reports the test results where the implications of Y ≤sm Xholds and Table 9
reports those where the implications of X ≤sm Y holds. Here, Y ≤sm Xmeans that we reject
the null of Y dominates and accept the null of X dominates for all the bootstrap critical
values, and similarly for X ≤sm Y.The second columns of Table 8 and 9 are the rank of each
state in terms of the total number of patents issued there. The results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests are failure to reject the null of equal marginal distributions for most cases, and
so is omitted.
It is notable that in most cases, distant citing supermodularly dominates localized citing,
which means that citing between faraway states may lead to greater expected social welfare
than localized citing. We observe some exceptions in 18 states but the numbers of subclasses
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Table 8. Test result (Y ≤sm X)
State Rank Number Subclass
CA 1 30 A63B, B01D, B05D, B08B, B24B, B29D, B41J, C07C, C07H,
C07K, C10G, C12P, C25F, E01F, G01B, G01S, G02C, G05F,
G06T, G09G, G10L, H01C, H01J, H01M, H01Q, H01R, H03M,
H04J, H04M, H05K
NY 2 21 B01D, B01J, B05D, B23K, B32B, B65H, C07C, C09D, C12Q,
D21F, F16J, G01N, G01R, G01V, G02B, H01M, H01R, H03M,
H04B, H04N, H05B
TX 3 19 A61B, A61K, A61N, A63B, B22F, C01B, C08F, C08L, C09K,
F15C, G01N, G01V, G06K, G06Q, G11C, H01R, H03K, H04L,
H05K
MA 4 13 A61M, B01D, G01B, G01N, G02B, G05B, G06K, G11B, H01L,
H01M, H02J, H04B, H04W
NJ 5 15 A61C, A61F, B01J, C07D, C10M, C11D, C12Q, G02B, G06K,
G10L, H01L, H04B, H04J, H04L, H04N
MI 6 9 A61B, B60Q, C07D, C08G, F01N, F02M, F16H, G02B, G06F
IL 7 11 A61B, A61K, A61M, B01D, B65D, C07D, G01N, H01L, H01R,
H04L, H04M
PA 8 13 A01N, A61B, A61K, A61M, B25B, C07D, C08F, G02B, G06F,
H01H, H01L, H01R, H02J
WA 9 12 A61K, B32B, C07D, G06K, G06Q, G10L, H01L, H01R, H04L,
H04M, H04N, H04W
OH 10 7 A01N, A61B, B23K, D21H, G05B, G06F, G06Q
MN 11 11 A47L, A61K, B32B, F01B, F25B, G01L, G11B, H01G, H01L,
H01M, H04L
FL 12 9 A61F, A61K, A61M, G02C, G06F, G08B, H01Q, H04B, H04L
NC 13 8 A61B, A61K, G02B, G06F, H01L, H01R, H04B, H04L
CT 14 11 A61B, A61K, A61L, A63F, C07D, F02K, G06F, G06Q, G07F,
H01L, H02H
CO 15 4 A61B, A61K, G06Q, H04M
WI 16 6 A01H, B32B, C08J, D21F, G06F, H01M
IN 17 3 A61B, A61F, G01N,
AZ 18 5 A61B, G01B, G06F, H01L, H01M
OR 19 4 A63F, B41J, G01R, H04L,
MD 20 4 A61K, G06F, H04L, H04M,
GA 21 6 B60R, B65D, H02H, H04L, H04M, H04W,
VA 22 2 G06F, H04L
MO 23 2 A61B, G06F
TN 24 3 A61B, A61F, C08L
UT 25 4 A61M, B60R, E21B, G06F
IA 27 2 A01H, G08B
NH 29 3 B01J, C07C, E21B
NH 29 4 F02G, G06F, H01L, H01R
KS 31 4 G06F, H04J, H04M, H04W
DE 33 1 B32B
RI 37 1 A61B
NE 39 2 A63F, G07F
27
Table 9. Test result (X ≤sm Y )
State Rank Number Subclass
CA 1 2 B05C, F16K
NY 2 2 D21H, F16K
TX 3 3 A61M, B82B, G02B
MA 4 2 B05D, F16L
MI 6 1 E04C
IL 7 1 A63F
PA 8 2 F16L, G01K
OH 10 4 C03B, D06L, G05F, G06K
MN 11 1 A62B
FL 12 1 C07C
NC 13 2 A01K,B60G
CO 15 1 H05K
WI 16 1 G04C
IN 17 1 B23P
OR 19 6 B26D, C07H, C09D, C12N, C25D, G02B
MD 20 2 B25B, C11D
GA 21 2 B31F, E05B
VA 22 1 F21V
TN 24 1 B27C
UT 25 1 A47B
NM 35 1 H01L
VT 42 1 F02G
for such cases are minor compared to the other way around. The number of potential su-
permodular dominance relationships tend to increase as the rank of a state, in terms of the
liveliness of patent activity, increases.
For patents issued in states and of subclasses not listed in Table 8 and 9, there is no
evidence of supermodular dominance holding between citations from the same state and
different states. In specific, they fall under either one of the following two cases: one where
we reject the null of implication of supermodular dominance holding in both directions, and
the other where we accept the null in both directions. The former case indicates there is no
supermodular dominance between localized and distant citations whatsoever, and the latter
case implies that there is not enough evidence to conclude so or the two citations may have
an equal distribution. In these cases, we cannot draw on the welfare implication regarding
the effect of localized and distant citing.
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Overall, our result implies that there are some subclasses in certain states, especially in
states where patent activities are lively, that exhibit the evidence of implications of su-
permodular dominance holding between localized and distant citing, while for most other
subclasses in most states, we cannot find evidence that such relationship exists. Also, the
effect of localized and distant citing on social welfare varies depending on patent locations
and characteristics. Yet, it is worth noting that we are only testing necessary conditions
of supermodular dominance. Analysis on a smaller than state-level could provide further
information on the pattern of the dominance depending on the degree of localization.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a consistent test of an implication of supermodular dominance,
a notion that captures positive interdependence among inputs of supermodular functions.
It can be utilized to see which input set creates greater utility, social welfare, production,
etc. In the simulation, we found that the test has desirable asymptotic and finite sample
properties under various parameter settings. We first applied our test to compare the inter-
dependence of stock returns of major five firms before and after the COVID-19. We found
the evidence that the returns after the COVID-19 supermodularly dominates that before
the event, which suggests that the pandemic increased the interdependence between major
stock returns. Another application of our test to comparing the effect on social welfare of
geographic and distant knowledge spillover, measured by patent citation, indicates that firms
having patents of certain subclasses in certain states, especially where patent activities are
active, might have supermodular dominance holding between the localized and distant citing
to their patents. In this case, we can conjecture that either localized or distant citing might
engender greater expected social welfare than the other. For other cases, either there is no
supermodular dominance relationship between localized and distant citing, or there is not
adequate evidence to conclude so or the two may have an equal distribution.
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In Appendix, we provide proofs of Theorems in the main text.







⇒ νi(·) in l∞(X )
jointly for i ∈ I, where D̂i(·) = (D̂Ui (·), D̂Li (·))ᵀ, Di(·) = (DUi (·), DLi (·))ᵀ, and νi(·) =
(νUi (·), νLi (·))ᵀ is a mean zero Gaussian process with covariance kernel C(x1, x2) =
limT→∞Eνi,T (x1)νi,T (x2)
ᵀ.






⇒ νi(·) in l∞(X )
conditional on W in P jointly for i ∈ I, where D̂∗i (·) = (D̂U∗i (·), D̂L∗i (·))ᵀ, and νi(·)
denotes a mean zero Gaussian process with covariance kernel C(x1, x2) defined in (i).
Proof of Lemma A1: (i) Let ξi,tfor i ∈ Ibe a generic random variable that denotes
max{Xi1,t, . . . , Xik,t}, max{Yi1,t, . . . , Yik,t}, min{Xi1,t, . . . , Xik,t}or min{Yi1,t, . . . , Yik,t}. Un-






|1 (ξi,t ≤ x′)− 1 (ξi,t ≤ x) |2 ≤ Cr
and hence its bracketing number satisfies N[] (ε,Fi, L2(P )) < Cε−2. Also, let
νξi,T (·) :=
√




[1 (ξi,t ≤ ·)− E1 (ξi,t ≤ ·)] ,
denote the empirical process indexed by f ∈ Fi. Then, by the CLT for bounded strong
mixing sequences (Hall and Heyde, 1980, Corollary 5.1) and Assumption 3.1(b), the finite
dimensional distribution of (νξi,T (x1), . . . , ν
ξ
i,T (xJ))converges to a normal distribution for all
(x1, . . . , xJ) ∈ RJ . Therefore, using the functional CLT of Andrews and Pollard (1994,
Collorary 2.3) and the mixing condition in Assumption 3.1(a), we can show that the stochastic
process νξi,T (·)converges weakly to a Gaussian process ν
ξ
i (·)with mean 0, covariance kernel




i,T (x2)and continuous sample paths. The weak convergence
33
holds jointly over i ∈ Iand different choices of ξi,t, because the limiting Gaussian processes
are separable and hence the joint convergence is equivalent to marginal convergence of each
process (van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, Theorem 1.4.8)). This establishes Lemma A1(i).
(ii) The result of Lemma A1(ii) follows from the result of Lemma A1(i) and the bootstrap
CLT of Politis and Romano (1994b, Theorem 3.1) because {Zt(·) := 1 (ξi,t ≤ ·) : t ≥ 1}can be
regarded as stationary Hilbert space valued random variables which are bounded and satisfy
the mixing condition
∑∞
s=1 αZ(s) <∞under Assumption 3.1(a). 































=: (A1,T + A2,T ) .
Note that whenever x ∈ X \ Bi, we have max{DUi (x), DLi (x)} < −aT,1 under the null hy-











































This implies that P (A1,T = 0) → 1, because supx∈X ,i∈I
√
T
∣∣∣D̂Ui (x)−DUi (x)∣∣∣ = Op(1) by
Lemma A1 and
√
TaT,1 →∞ by Assumption 3.3.





























=: S̄T . (A.2)
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Also, we have




































Now, by (A.2), (A.3) and the arguments similar to those for (A.1), we have P (A2,T = S̄T )→
1. This establishes Lemma 3.1, as desired. 



















[D̂Ui (x)−DUi (x)]2+ + [D̂Li (x)−DLi (x)]2+
}
dx.






Let B0i,j denote Bi,j with aT,1 replaced by aT,2 for j = 1, 2, 3. We have
P
(
Bi,j ≤ B̂i,j ≤ B0i,j
)
→ 1 (A.5)
using the arguments of Linton, Song and Whang (2010, Proof of Theorem 2). Define S̃∗T to
be the bootstrap statistic S∗T (defined in (11)) with B̂i,j replaced by Bi,j for j = 1, 2, 3. Let
























where SkT and c
∗
kT ,α,η
are the same as ST and c
∗
T,α,η, except that the sample size T is replaced
by kT . Let σ̃T = V ar(S̃T ). Since {σ̃T : T ≥ 1} is a bounded non-negative sequence, there
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exists a further subsequence {lT : T ≥ 1} ⊂ {kT : T ≥ 1} such that σ̃lT converges. Consider





















≤ α + o(1), (A.9)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that c∗T,α,η ≥ c∗T,α ≥ c̃∗T,α with probability
approaching one by (A.6), the second inequality follows from (A.4), and the last inequality
holds by the bootstrap consistency result in Lemma A1 and the uniform continuous mapping
theorem (Linton, Song and Whang (2010, Lemma A1)).




















where the first inequality follows from (A.4), the second inequality holds by the definition of
c∗lT ,α,η, and the last convergence to zero follows from the condition limT→∞ σ̃lT = 0 and the
fact η > 0 .
















converges along {kT}, it also converges along the subsequence {lT} .
Therefore, the result of Theorem 3.2(i) holds because the limsup in (A.11) is equal to the
limit in (A.7).
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{[D̂Ui (x)−DUi (x)]2− + [D̂Li (x)−DLi (x)]2−}dx. (A.12)
The last term of (A.12) is Op(1) by the weak convergence result in Lemma A1(i). Also, under






{[DUi (x)]2+ + [DLi (x)]2+}dx→∞.
The result of Theorem 3.2(ii) now holds because c∗T,α,η = Op(1) by Lemma A1(ii). 
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